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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890583-CA 
v. s 
RICKY PALMER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Petitioner. : 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendant presents two issues in his petition for 
rehearing: 
1. Did the Court erroneously remand this case to the 
trial court for a determination of the inevitable discovery 
question? 
2. If the Court correctly remanded the case to the 
trial court for a determination of the inevitable discovery 
question, does the Court's opinion give adequate guidance to the 
lower court concerning the scope of its consideration of that 
question? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ricky Palmer, was charged with retail theft, 
a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-602 and 76-6-
412(l)(b)(i) (1990) (R. 6-7). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress, defendant entered and the court accepted a conditional 
guilty plea to the charge pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 
935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (R. 31-37; T. 81-83)* Under Sery, 
defendant preserved the suppression issue for appellate review. 
On appeal, this Court ruled that the trial court had 
erroneously denied defendant's motion to suppress the x-ray of 
defendant, because the warrantless x-ray, which revealed the 
presence of the stolen ring in defendant's body, violated the 
fourth amendment. However, the Court remanded the case to the 
trial court to determine whether the ring would inevitably have 
been discovered by the police. State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 42 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990). Defendant petitioned for 
rehearing, and this Court requested that the State .file a 
response. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Most of the facts pertinent to defendant's petition for 
rehearing are accurately set forth in the Court's opinion. 
Palmer, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. at 42-43. One additional relevant 
fact not set forth there is that after Sgt. Mayo was unable to 
secure a suitable isolation cell for defendant at the Salt Lake 
County Jail, he sought and obtained defendant's apparent consent 
to an x-ray examination (T. 13, 28, 30-31). Defendant accurately 
sets forth in his petition the portion of Sgt. Mayo's testimony 
that is relevant to the question of what arrangements he pursued 
with the Salt Lake County Jail concerning an isolation cell for 
defendant. Pet. at 3-6. A stipulation of facts entered into by 
the parties further described the circumstances of defendant's 
placement in an isolation cell. That stipulation was as follows: 
[I]f Det. Earl Price were called, he would 
testify to several things. First would be 
that he arranged for Mr. Palmer to be placed 
in the Salt Lake County Jail in an isolation 
cell where Mr. Palmer could not leave and Mr. 
Palmer's feces could not leave, and it would 
be retained. 
Additionally, that he informed Mr. Palmer 
that he would remain in the cell until the 
ring was produced and that Mr. Palmer, in 
response to that, admitted that he had the 
ring and eventually did produce the ring to 
Det. Price who has the ring in custody and 
that if he were called he would bring the 
ring and it would be produced into evidence. 
(T. 61-62). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In arguing that the stolen ring contained in 
defendant's body would inevitably have been discovered by the 
police, the State necessarily relied on the record developed in 
the trial court. Accordingly, the State agrees with defendant 
that a remand of the case for further factual development would 
not be proper. However, the State disagrees with defendant that 
"the evidence [presented to the trial court] is capable of a 
single factual determination which leads to the legal conclusion 
that the inevitable discovery doctrine is not applicable to the 
instant case." Pet. at 11. Although admittedly a close 
question, the trial court could find that the record demonstrates 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the ring would inevitably 
have been discovered through lawful means—i.e., that the record 
demonstrates that the police, once they suspected that defendant 
had swallowed the ring, intended to place defendant in an 
isolation cell at some point in an effort to recover the ring. 
Therefore, the Court could properly remand the case to 
the trial court for the limited purpose of determining, based on 
the record already developed, the "fact-sensitive" question of 
whether the ring would inevitably have been discovered by the 
police. 
INTRODUCTION 
A petition for rehearing is appropriate only when the 
Court has "misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or 
facts, or . • . overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or . . . based the decision on some wrong 
principle of law, or . . . misapplied or overlooked something 
which materially affects the result." Cummings v. Nielson, 42 
Utah 157, 172, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913). The argument portion of 
this brief will demonstrate that rehearing is not warranted. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT APPROPRIATELY REMANDED DEFENDANT'S 
CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF 
THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ISSUE. 
After ruling that the trial court had erroneously 
determined that the warrantless x-ray of defendant was lawful, 
this Court remanded defendant's case to the trial court for a 
determination of the "fact-sensitive" issue concerning inevitable 
discovery of the ring. State v. Palmer, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 
45 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1990). Defendant claims that a remand 
is inappropriate because "the evidence [presented to the trial 
court] is capable of a single factual determination which leads 
to the legal conclusion that the inevitable discovery doctrine is 
not applicable to the instant case." Pet. at 11. Contrary to 
defendant's view, this Court appropriately remanded the 
inevitable discovery question to the trial court for an initial 
determination. 
As defendant correctly points out, Sgt. Mayo's 
testimony is critical to a determination of whether the ring 
would inevitably have been discovered by the police through their 
placement of defendant in an isolation cell, as they did after 
obtaining the x-ray which revealed the ring inside of defendant's 
body. Admittedly, it is not entirely clear from Mayo's testimony 
what the intentions of the police were with respect to isolating 
defendant prior to the time the incriminating x-ray was obtained. 
However, his testimony, coupled with other evidence, raises a 
question of fact about whether defendant would necessarily have 
been placed in an isolation cell by the police in 311 effort to 
recover the ring, regardless of whether an x-ray of defendant had 
been obtained. Contrary to defendant's contention, Mayo's 
testimony is not susceptible to only one interpretation—i.e., 
that once Mayo had received word from the jail that the requested 
isolation cell was not available, the police did not intend to 
place defendant in such a cell at some future time (as they 
ultimately did). Clearly, Mayo was interested in securing a 
suitable isolation cell, and when that was not immediately 
available, he sought defendant's consent to an x-ray examination. 
Having received defendant's apparent consent to an x-ray, Mayo 
discontinued his efforts to secure an isolation cell. 
Nevertheless, such a cell was subsequently used by the police to 
recover the ring. Given the suspicions of the police that 
defendant had swallowed the ring, and Mayo's initial efforts to 
place defendant in isolation (efforts which appear to have been 
temporarily terminated because defendant consented to an x-ray), 
it seems quite clear that the police would have placed defendant 
in an isolation cell in an effort to recover the ring, even 
without the incriminating x-ray. In short, the police would have 
done so whether they had been certain that defendant had 
swallowed the ring (which they were after the x-ray of defendant) 
or merely suspicious that he had swallowed the ring (which they 
would have been had they not obtained an x-ray), since the only 
means of recovering the ring, an important piece of physical 
evidence, would be to place defendant in isolation. 
Although on remand the trial court would not be 
obligated to make the foregoing findings regarding inevitable 
discovery, it could validly do so and thus conclude that the 
record demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
ring would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means 
by the police. See United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 
1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The 'inevitable discovery' exception 
adopted by the Court in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), 
allows the introduction of illegally obtained evidence if the 
government can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
tainted evidence would inevitably have been discovered through 
lawful means."). See also State v. Vincik, 436 N.W.2d 350, 354 
(Iowa 1989) (though gun on bed under sheet obtained in illegal 
warrantless search at homicide scene, inevitable discovery rule 
applicable, as the gun was certain to be discovered upon later 
removal of body). And such a ruling would be consistent with the 
requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine that "'the fact 
or likelihood that makes the discovery inevitable arise from 
circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal search 
itself.'" Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d at 1396 (quoting United 
States v. Boatwriqht, 822 F.2d 862, 864-64 (9th Cir. 1987)). In 
short, the trial court should be given the opportunity to address 
this open, and admittedly close, factual question. 
Therefore, the Court appropriately remanded defendant's 
case to the trial court for an initial determination of the fact-
sensitive issue of inevitable discovery. It correctly concluded 
that "[t]his court cannot properly determine the outcome of a 
fact-sensitive issue where the record below is not clear and 
uncontroverted, or capable of only one finding." Palmer/ 147 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 45 (citation omitted). 
The State agrees with defendant that the trial court's 
determination should be made upon the record already developed 
before it, and that the taking of additional evidence would not 
be appropriate. If the Court concurs in this view and further 
believes that its opinion does not make this view clear, it 
should modify its opinion accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should deny 
rehearing. 
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